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Abstract
The research objective of this article is to identify didactic practice and its competence levels and discuss
possible differences and common traits within these competence levels. Furthermore, the paper seeks to develop an
understanding of didactic practice which is led by an educational interest related to the learning of an unknown
future or that which is unforeseen. In search for a framework of such a didactic practice one of the findings of the
paper is that hermeneutics falls short as this theory mainly revolves around understanding. If we are to take
questions of the unknown and unforeseen seriously, so we argue, there is a need for another didactic approach. We
suggest that ironic questioning may be complicit. Irony is about concealing and withdrawal of knowledge, so as to
creating space for silence, doubt and reflection. Thus we argue that the ironic questioning may emerge as a
complement to different competence levels of didactic practice, including planning, conducting and evaluation of
teaching, and discussion of teaching and curricula or research, towards renewed didactic theory.
Keywords: Didactics; Unforeseen; Practice; Ironic questioning
Introduction
A significant and underlying question in this article is: What is
meant by didactic practice for the unforeseen? We assume that there is
a relatively big difference between teaching that is steered by
predetermined policies, with clear objectives for both the academic
content and evaluation, and teaching that is intended to help students
develop skills to cope with unforeseen events. The latter kind of
teaching must create room for spontaneity whilts deviating from clear
objectives and planned activities.
Now, if we refer to the relevant literature, we will find that, the
concept of practice is often used in a simplified manner, without a
precise definition. Furthermore, it may be thought that theory should
often designate normative guidelines on what practice should be about.
This is where we adopt a different approach. Although we still assert
that didactics is a normative discipline, we contend that it is necessary
to understand the concept of ‘normativity’ in new and different terms,
when the intention is to learn for what is unknown. This is
substantiated by the fact that didactic practice has an enigmatic basis
that cannot fully be anticipated or completely understood.
Consequently, there exist subtle differences within didactic practice. In
certain situations, it may be possible to make predictions based on
experience. Nonetheless, this may not be feasible in other situations in
which, for example, learning for the unforeseen is prominent. When
such situations direct didactic practice, they extend beyond the
predetermined and, at the same time, rebel against every form of
predefined frame of reference. Therefore, didactic practice should be
seen as transcending its traditional and theoretical role, in which
norm-determining and rational ways of acting in didactic situations
are developed.
The research objective of this article is to identify didactic practice
and its competence levels and discuss possible differences and
common traits within these competence levels. The paper is divided
into two parts. The first section attempts to clarify what we mean by
‘didactic practice’, while the second attempts to explain what is
understood by the term, ‘ironic questioning’. The goal is to develop an
understanding of didactic practice which is led by an educational
interest related to the learning of that which is unknown or
unforeseen.
Didactic Practice
To clarify what is meant by didactic practice, we will now look
closely at three of its characteristics: (i) its intrinsic value, (ii) its time
perspective and (iii) its enigmatic or mysterious basis.
The intrinsic value and tact of didactic practice
How can the transition from theory to practice be understood and
legitimised? Alternatively, which comes first, theory or practice? How
often have we not failed to encounter such a line of enquiry in the field
of pedagogy or in didactics? Nonetheless, we maintain that such
questions lead to unfortunate understandings of pedagogy and
didactics; unfortunate in the sense that didactic practice results in
being derived from a norm, whether it is theory or practice that
develops such a norm. Therefore, we propose that we cease to
challenge theory using practice or vice versa. We will attempt to
demonstrate this by using two examples taken from the history of
pedagogy.
The first example is taken from Schleiermacher [1], who had a
significant influence on modern pedagogy, particularly in regard to
German hermeneutic pedagogy [2]. In his renowned lectures on
pedagogy from 1826, he emphasised that “[p]ractice has intrinsic
value”[1]. By this, he meant that practice possesses its own value,
which cannot be determined by theory beforehand. However, this is
does not mean that practice takes place more or less independently of
theory or that practice must come first, before our experiences from
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practice have been related to theory. It would be incorrect to interpret
this as practice having preferential status; that it presupposes that
practice precedes theory. If that were the case, practice would be norm-
determining; with the result that theory would become inherently
dependent on practice for its legitimisation. It follows that practice
would be reduced to a generic and universal phenomenon, after which
there would be a risk of overlooking that which practice demands.
Admittedly, Schleiermacher added that, “practice becomes...more
tangible through theory” (ibid, our translation). However, this does not
mean that pedagogy, on a theoretical and normative basis, will be able
to point out or provide clear signals regarding practice. Neither the
theorist nor the practitioner bears the final responsibility for managing
the situations that may arise in practice. By contrast, theory and
practice are integrated. This means that theory is not located outside
the sphere of practice, often with the result that theory exerts pressure
on practice, which thereby becomes objectified and marginalised.
Instead, theory and practice are connected, albeit in an internal
manner but not in an external manner, as is the case when oil and
water are poured into the same glass.
The second example is taken from another pedagogue who has been
influential in modern pedagogy: Herbart [3]. By examining Herbart’s
lectures on pedagogy from 1802, it can be seen that he holds that any
practitioner which forgoes theory has to undertake practise which is
based on chance and uncritical assessments. On the other hand, we
understand that the practitioner who makes use of theory as a
normative guideline for practice is necessarily obliged to describe
conditions which are far removed from practice situations, during
which time the person concerned will be unable to gain the specific
details that practice produces [4]. Herbart solved the problem of
theory and practice using his concept of “pedagogical tact” [3].
According to Benner [5], Herbart’s concept of tact can be understood
as operating between theory and practice, and can be seen as an action.
Didactics is thereby made flexible, which means that tact can be
adjusted and changed in such a way that theory is not divorced from
practice or that practice is reduced to a question of chance.
Schleiermacher and Herbart offer two alternative understandings of
practice and theory, and the relationship between them. Although they
are different, they are alike in the sense that they both challenge the
view that theory must be unambiguously norm-determining in a sense
that is explicit and clearly formulated in such a way that it serves as a
benchmark. Where Schleiermacher emphasises the intrinsic value and
dignity of practice, Herbart stresses the concept of tact. Neither of
them place theory or practice in opposition to each other. From both
of these perspectives, it is impossible to apply a normative guideline or
form of schematic thinking in practise on account of its unpredictable
and heterogeneous nature. By way of example, a secondary school
teacher may have two year-ten classes in English as a subject. Even
though the teacher has a goal of following the same programme in
both classes, the teaching will differ to a great extent because of
differences between individuals, situations, etc. Therefore, every action
which the teacher undertakes is different and requires a completely
unique approach, which no theory can grasp fully. It follows that
didactic practice is foreign to symmetric situations as well as being a
revolt against theory, understood as a normative calculation.
Accordingly, the danger of identifying practice with the help of theory
is that practice may easily be reduced to theory, whereby the theorist
becomes entangled in his own norm-determining system of
definitions, or he only sees what lies in theory itself. Altogether, this
line of reasoning leads us to a new understanding of time, which
underlies didactic practice.
Overall, Schleiermacher and Herbart [1,3] introduce two levels of
competence, that is, the planning and conducting of teaching. In
modern didactic theory of practice, however, it is more common to
construct didactic practice by way of three levels of competence. For
example, the late Norwegian professor of didactics Dale [6,7] is
outlining three practice levels of competence (C), which are related to
each other. These are: “to teach (C1), to plan or evaluate lessons (C2)
and to critically discuss lessons and teaching plans (C3)” [6]. The third
level of competence, C3, also involves research in which the aim
consists of constructing theory [7]. Not unlike Dale [7], we establish as
an underlying principle that didactic practice has a normative
foundation, developed through practice, theory and empirics.
Nonetheless, our position differs from that of Dale [7] in various ways.
This entails, for instance, that we focus our attention elsewhere, namely
on the notion that didactic practice can, in addition to more traditional
aims, also stimulate pedagogical interest related to the unknown and
unforeseen. Therefore, we ask whether didactic practice is in need of
an aid or a supplement to: Teaching itself (C1), planning (insofar as
possible) of the teaching based on the above interests (C2) and
discussion of teaching and teaching plans or research, and/or
development work, which may lead to a renewal of didactic theory
(C3).
The analysis shows that Dale’s didactic theory includes more levels
of competence than the classic theoreticians, Schleiermacher and
Herbart [1,3]. Whilst these classics to a lesser degree discuss their
competence levels in relation to continuity and causality, Dale adds a
timeframe for didactic practice, by way of distinguishing between
competence levels that are interdependent; namely, planning (C2),
conducting and (C1) reflection (C3) of teaching. Thus far it looks as if
Dale’s theory of didactic practice may work as a tool for predictability
and control, without any tools to grasp unforeseen and enigmatic
situations in practice. By this we see that the concept of time is relevant
for the analysis of didactic practice.
Didactic time
Didactic practice has traditionally been based on an understanding
of time in which the beginning, ending and intervening period can be
located on a straight line, on which the old and new progress according
to a (pre)determined process and in consecutive order. In other words,
we are presented with a quantitative understanding of time, which is
characterised by a homogenous and successive composition, which
makes it entirely possible to measure what occurs within the give
timeframe [8]. Contemporary pedagogy and didactics are located in
what many have referred to as “the age of measurement” [9], where the
focus is on measuring the gains from teaching and similar fields. In the
age of measurement, evidence-based research plays an important role;
research that aims to base its findings on evidence, which can then be
applied more or less directly to the field of practice. In other words, it is
desirable to ensure that research leads to sound knowledge of the
didactic field of practice. In this way, we adopt a positivist approach to
research, whereby the researcher believes that reality can be grasped as
it appears. It is with this perspective that modern educational
researchers concern themselves with the reliable and the precise, with
the result that the psychologist often represents a role model for
pedagogy and didactics. In the same way that psychology appears to
secure specific and tangible results, the educational researcher seeks to
gain sound knowledge but also that which is regarded as having utility.
Therefore, everything that falls outside the framework of utility is
regarded as being without use. For instance, ambiguous discussions
concerning attitudes and values have little or no utility in terms of a
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positivist mind set. Instead, what occurs is an affirmation of the faith
that research data can reflect reality in such a way that these data can
be applied directly to didactic-practice situations. This line of thought
thereby becomes an instrument or tool whereby robust public policy,
often combined with effective organisation, can anticipate and master a
predetermined future scenario. In general, as a result of an enormous
focus on tangible results, schools have been guided by non-pedagogical
principles based on homogeneity and quantity, which are reflected in
what appears to be education’s most fundamental question: how should
pupils be educated from immaturity to maturity/ from child to adult/
from below the age of legal responsibility to legally responsible/from
uneducated to educated?
Such questions are bound together by an understanding of time
which is based on the idea of succession and sequence. However, on
closer examination, we can see that that pedagogy and didactics, as
interpreted is not necessarily concerned with these questions [10].
Kierkegaard did not restrict himself to an interpretation of time as a
straightforward sequence of development in the way that
developmental psychology and progressive pedagogy, led by thinkers
such as Piaget and Dewey, have done. Until recently, it has been
thought that the task of pedagogy and didactics has consisted of the
education of an individual into something specific, for example, into a
democratic citizen. In doing so, it presupposed that the pupil lacked
something from the outset, which the teacher-through didactic
processes-should impart to the not-yet-mature individual. By contrast,
Kierkegaard adhered to a different understanding of time. In effect,
time was understood as a qualitative and heterogeneous factor. Instead
of using the pupil’s lack of something as the point of departure,
Kierkegaard assumed that it was necessary to take something away. He
thereby put more emphasis on interruptions, unforeseen events and,
quite simply, everything that interferes with mankind’s existence in a
surprising and incalculable manner. Meanwhile, he refrained from
examining issues that are germane to psychology, sociology, namely
that man should develop himself in a process of continual self-
improvement, desirably from an epistemological and moral
perspective. This line of thought is actually similar to the basic tenet of
sports, according to which an athlete trains intensively in order to
develop and improve his abilities. Instead, Kierkegaard focused on
what could turn pupils away from prejudices, false misconceptions and
egocentric compulsions, etc., and thereby challenge pupils, without
knowing where the results would lead [10]. In this regard, didactic
practice is linked to another concept of time, in addition to the
homogenous variant; one that is required in certain situations but not
in the form of an overriding and guiding concept, as modern didactics
presupposes.
Didactic practice and its enigmatic basis
To allow for the possibility of regarding time as a qualitative and
heterogeneous factor, it is necessary that the practitioner of didactics
takes practice’s unpredictability into account as it will never be
mastered, either before or following didactic practice. Accordingly, one
is faced by an aporia, which effectively acts like a blind alley [11].
Therefore, aporia can be understood as an unceasing phenomenon, as
is the case with arithmetic in schools – and, as aporia is distributed in
the eternal, didactic practice implies, both for the teacher and pupil, a
means of experiencing something that cannot be experienced. For
instance, this may apply to teaching that is interested in questions of
the unknown. This form of teaching can be compared to giving a gift,
albeit not in a traditional sense. In this case, it is concerned with the
teacher’s task of giving something he or she neither predict or control.
Consequently, this is [im] possible as it is not feasible to give away
something one does not possess. It is equally [im] possible to receive
such a gift because, in reality, it does not exist. It is entirely possible
that the teacher may be aware, to a limited extent, of the gift’s content
and how it is to be received; however, it is [im] possible for this to be
fully predicted. Therefore, both teacher and pupil can be said to
experience the [im] possible through didactic practice.
It is entirely impossible to experience aporia, this intractable
enigma, which characterises the fundamental structure of didactic
practice. It follows that didactic practice is far removed from the
calculated symmetry of theory. Instead, it is far closer to aporia’s
absolute asymmetry. If, on the other hand, the didactic action simply
consists of applying a normative rule, setting in motion a programme
or performing a calculation, theory may well be applied in such a
manner that practice changes, in which case it would occur in a
somewhat naïve sense. This is because didactic practice goes beyond
norms, rules, programmes and expectations, etc. By way of example, it
is possible for a teacher to plan learning and teaching in a traditional
didactic manner. However, when dealing with the unforeseen, which
always occurs in a practice situation, classical didactic models and
theories prove to be inadequate, for example Klafki’s [12] theory of
formation. This is related to the notion that the unforeseen follows a
heterogeneous time perspective, in contrast to the teleological or linear
view of time in classical didactics, according to which the future is
regarded as something that merely lies ‘ahead’ and waits to be fulfilled.
On account of the unforeseen, didactic practice’s heterogeneous time
perspective implies that it has a tendency for continually arriving and,
accordingly, consists of incommensurable or incalculable elements. For
this reason, the practitioners of didactics must restrict themselves to
the possible in regard to practice. Consequently, didactic practice
cannot be controlled using norm-determining and calculating theories.
Nonetheless, the solution does not lie in abandoning theory.
Although didactic practice can never be fully understood, there will
always be questions of interpretation in regard to practice. This means
that hermeneutics, which has had a strong influence on both
hermeneutic and modern pedagogy, must not be rejected as a
theoretical ‘tool.’ For instance, Dilthey [13], as well as his successors,
held that it would be instructive to examine the historical record in an
attempt to interpret and understand how earlier ideas on education
and teaching had been put into practise. Secondly, this understanding
may shed new light on one’s own time and its problems and challenges
in connection with education and teaching. The objective lies in
learning from that which has worked and that which has not worked,
as well as adapting earlier approaches related to development and
teaching to one’s own time and context. However, this is a hermeneutic
and formation-oriented approach, according to which cultural and
historical values play a central role. As far as didactic practice is
concerned, different rules apply for learning of the unknown. In such
cases, hermeneutics will fall short of the set requirements precisely
because this type of practice establishes demands that exceed the
purpose of hermeneutics, which is principally concerned with coming
to an understanding [14].
We thereby assume a different position to Dale, who asserts the
following: “We associate pedagogical practice in the schooling of pupils
with comprehension-orientated communication. Interaction between
teachers and pupils is related to mutual behavioural expectations
concerning intelligibility in the use of language, veracity in behavioural
expression and validity of content” [6,7]. However, we will argue that
pedagogical and didactic practice needs to encompass more than
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merely arriving at an understanding. What then? Should we turn to
critical theory, as is postulated in critical didactics?
These theories are needed as well, among other reasons, in order to
discover the critical issues that concern practice. The weakness of
critical didactics, from Blankertz [15] to Schäfer et al. [10], Klafki [12],
is that it often involves an alternative or reciprocation to the person
making the criticism. For example, it can entail criticising the teacher’s
role for being too authoritarian, when the teacher should be acting as
an advocate for freedom. Alternatively, it may be concerned with
criticising or replacing traditional forms of imparting knowledge, with
dialogue as an alternative. It may be thought that this approach serves
the interests of didactic practice, but this approach is just as
problematic. The reason for this is that the new, which in our case is
the focus on freedom and dialogue, is firmly rooted in a normative
basis. In other words, the new is introduced without either critical
instructions or descriptive, empirical research.
Both hermeneutic pedagogy and critical didactics will, on account
of its strong normative signals, cause an immunisation of the
unexpected, the uncontrolled and the surprising, which characterises
didactic practice. Owing to its enigmatic foundations, this form of
didactic practice rebels against the framework and postulates of theory,
and the issue at hand is how one can ‘solve’ the question of didactics’
normativity.
In other words, we have shown that both the classic and the modern
approach to didactic practice are incomplete, in their own ways. As for
the modern approach, we find that there is a missing link which may
justify modern didactic thinking by taking into account discontinuous
and unpredictable structures of didactic practice. The characteristics of
such thinking are that didactic practice must include a certain form of
controllability while still creating space for that which is enigmatic,
surprising and unpredictable in practice. It is here Kierkegaard’s
understanding of irony may be a contribution, functioning as the
missing link between the three competence levels of didactic practice
and thus complement the modern approach. In the following section,
we will therefore outline some basic thoughts concerning what we will
refer to as ironic questioning, which as we will argue-will shed new
light on the issue of the normativity of didactics.
Ironic Questioning
In a didactic-practice situation, the teacher may, in a countless
number of ways, convey the notion that the pupil is correct, while the
former is incorrect. This is a clear example of how irony can be applied
in a didactic-practice situation which is based on reality. This method
of using irony will now be explained in the following paragraph.
By starting with the etymological term, it can be seen that irony has
its origins in the Greek word eironeia, which pertains to concealment
and the pretence of ignorance. Through the use of irony, elements are
kept hidden, partly by allowing for silence in what is expressed orally.
However, this does not involve concealing the notion that something
will be revealed, for example, by giving the opposite meaning of what is
said. This is a vulgar form of irony, which constitutes a hazard in regard
to didactic practice. It owes partly to the fact that irony, when directed
towards a receiver who does not understand irony, will cause the
individual to feel unintelligent, with the result that the pupil becomes
constrained and excluded, instead of being educated. In opposition to
vulgar irony, we aim to focus our attention on a form of irony which
intervenes without having to be understood, in contrast to
hermeneutics as well as Dales [7] understanding of didactic practice.
Neither is the user of irony naive in the sense that she pretends that she
does not know, while, in reality, she is fully aware of the circumstances.
Nonetheless, the user of irony is naive because she doubts her own
opinions as well as the others’ points of view. This is also one of the
reasons that this form of irony is compelling enough to break apart
prejudices, misconceptions, biases, etc.
Indeed, the ironic questioning starts by destabilising, complicating
or provoking doubt and, not least, paradoxes. In such a way, this form
of irony is unequivocally problematic in terms of practice’s scope for
tension between its calculable and incalculable facets. It is also striking
that this form of irony has the ability to transcend the traditional
understanding of normativity. This occurs through posing (often
indirectly and in silence) a question without either prejudice,
knowledge or, as Kierkegaard states, “At the moment we ask, we know
nothing”. In this sense, irony is ‘normative’. However, in equal measure,
it cannot be seen as an entirely calculable guideline, similar to a
calculating matrix. Rather than envelop oneself in common sense and
the rationality of theory, as Dale [6] does in using his concept of
“reason in didactic action”, this form of irony should be seen as being
closer to the irrational, even though this is also somewhat inaccurate.
In this sense, irony is a form of enigma; anything other than the
theories which proceed in a straight line, without detours or
distractions. Instead, Irony is located on the middle of the spectrum
between the determinable and indeterminable. Irony constantly moves
between these two extremities, which is thereby characterised by
instability. Therefore, irony does not correspond to the demands that a
conventional theory poses. Instead, it disregards the attributes of
theory, such as precision and truthfulness, by avoiding every
conventional and transparent approach-whereupon all form of rational
thinking ceases.
While we examine how irony can give us new insight into the
question of the normativity of didactics, it is warranted to ask what
results from the ironic questioning. If we direct our attention to
contemporary, evidence-based, educational research, to address the
issue pointedly, does it have as its goal the production of clear results,
an advantage or, at least, something valuable; something which can be
used constructively in a didactic-practice situation? This may, for
instance, relate to research on methods of assessment, the results of
which should preferably be applied as directly as possible to didactic
practice. By itself, irony produces no tangible results. Instead, we will,
after the application of irony, be confronted with both differences and
disagreements, rather than unambiguous conclusions, concurrence
and consensus. Irony will never lead us to a position from which it is
possible to say that something is accomplished and overcome, as
though we have attained a synthesis between the definite and
indefinite. If we are to attempt to be more precise and systematic, we
should draw on three conditions to which irony can ‘contribute’ in a
didactic situation where learning for the unknown has a central place.
Destruction and dissolution
Firstly, irony has the ability to release something that has been
locked, put question marks next to or destroy unproductive
perspectives, courses of action, etc.
Let us examine this in a teaching scenario (C1). How should, for
instance, the teacher interact with secondary school pupils who are
strongly influenced by violent computer games; attitudes which are
expressed in both speech and actions? In broad terms, it is possible to
imagine two possibilities where the teacher’s pedagogical-normative
interest is related to the pupils’ existence, which is unforeseen. The first
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possibility is that of interacting with the pupil directly using various
forms of moralising, which are predetermined or known beforehand.
Such a method would likely lead to two intractable positions, rigidly
opposed to one another. The other possibility involves interacting with
the pupil indirectly using irony as a mirror, with which the pupils can
see themselves and possibly also re-examine their own attitudes.
However, it must be added that the potential for nothing to occur is
present when irony is used, and it should also be used with caution as a
series of problems may arise [10].
It is important to emphasise that irony must not be equated with
criticism. In contrast to a critic, irony allows the pre-existing to remain
as it is. However, by acting in a passive-active manner, irony will be
able to destroy the pre-existing. Provided that the user of irony had had
a wish to overcome the existing, for instance, the aforementioned
secondary school pupil’s negative attitude, what then? She would have
seen a weakness in the existing from the perspective of something new;
she must have had a predetermined norm or idea to be used as a
comparison, just as if she had had an understanding of the future at
her disposal. This is not the case for the user of irony because she poses
questions without having the answer beforehand. However, when the
user of irony has the new under her control, then we must ask how she
is able to destroy the existing. Kierkegaard refers here to John the
Baptist, who was not “he who was to come. He was not cognizant of
what should come, and he therefore destroyed Judaism. He did not
destroy it using the new per se, but he destroyed it using its own self.”
Here we have a clear example of irony as a ‘normative concept’ being
associated with the concept of time as arriving. In essence, John the
Baptist was concerned with the arrival of the Son of God. He followed
what may be regarded as a messianic understanding of time, which is
similar to the heterogeneous time perspective, according to which one
is open to the future’s arrival without knowing what, is that, will arrive.
The issue at hand concerns an entirely surprising future scenario which
arrives on the basis of that which exists, and whereby that which exists
is destroyed at the moment the new, (which in reality has never
existed), arrives.
Another good example of this is provided by Kierkegaard himself
when he was faced with the problem that Hegel had created an all-
encompassing system, of which it might be said almost, swallowed
everything that it came across. How was he to respond to this system?
If he had chosen to respond with either criticism or a rebuttal, what
then? He would have been swallowed whole, becoming part of Hegel’s
system or simply a footnote in the wider system. Therefore,
Kierkegaard had no choice other than to respond to Hegel’s system
with a device that was irreproachable. We must assume this was the
reason that Kierkegaard, in this instance, chose irony (and similar
rhetorical devices such as humour, etc.) when he was able to see the
faults in Hegel’s system and, at the same time, take it apart and destroy
it, while smiling and laughing at its ostensible perfection yet without
being reconcilable himself. As incredible as it may sound, this process
of destruction occurred without anticipation, criticism or rebuttal from
Kierkegaard.
Hyper-intensifying change
Secondly, it is not possible to use irony as method to change practice
in such a way that disharmony becomes harmony, balance and
equilibrium. If we wish to discuss change as a result of ironic
questioning, we must address a hyper-intensifying change, which is in
a state of constant flux and tension.
This owes to the nature of irony, which does not “contain the
element of reconciliation…, but rather reinforces the vain in its vanity.
It makes the mad even madder”. As such irony can reinforce the
violence aspect of computer games, which may cause doubt. Thus
irony has no need whatsoever to create harmony, but instead creates a
space that allows the enigmatic to produce the basis for its existence.
Wherever the hermeneutical is in danger of limiting, reducing or even
distorting our understanding of the unknown and the new, by the
affirmation of making the unknown proximate, tangible and known,
the ironic perspective allows for the strengthening and anticipation of
tensions and movements. Again, this is related to irony’s capacity to
intervene without the goal of wanting to understand, which stands as a
stark inversion of the aims of hermeneutics and of traditional
didactics. The typical hermeneutic would be of the opinion that one
expresses oneself, either in writing or verbally, in order to be
understood. The user of irony, by contrast, has no intention of being
understood, and seeks neither unity nor reconciliation.
However, what if we set a goal of wanting to understand? This
would result in reconciliation or in a universal synthesis of one form or
another. Therefore, for the user of irony, the questions are more
important than the answers which, in a weak sense, are questioning
and doubtful, just as much in relation to their own opinions as to those
of others. By posing questions in didactic settings, it is also possible to
challenge what we accept as true in traditional terms (for example a
students’ perception of reality), but never that we arrive at an
understanding or a clear answer. The user of irony is always left in an
aporetic state, in an impasse. In equal measure, this ironic-aporetic
attitude is a didactic condition, a premise, required to enter into
relations with the unknown’s difference and distinctiveness. This stands
in contrast to the hermeneutic who, paradoxically, loses both himself
and everyone else because the parties in the moment of reconciliation
turn out to be speaking the same language.
Self-education
Thirdly, the use of irony can make possible the education of the
person deploying irony as an alternative, aid or supplement to the
critical didactic evaluation level (C2) and to the research and
development level (C3). This point has often been overlooked in
academic literature on pedagogical-philosophical issues1. Instead,
attention has been directed towards the educative effects of irony on
the receiver, without accounting for irony’s educative effect on those
who make use of irony themselves. Kierkegaard is an exception when
he speaks of “Governance (SKS 4:80).” Kierkegaard’s Governance has
his authorship as his principle abode in such a way that what he
himself has written represents a potential for an education for him.
1 Rorty R (1989) Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Nehemas, Alexander (1998) The art of
living: Socratic reflections from plato to foucault. Berkeley: University of California; Vlastos G (1991) Socrates, ironist and moral
philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Vasiliou, Iakovos (2002) Socrates’ reverse irony. Classical Quarterly, 52(1), pp. 220–
230; Smeyers, Paul (2005). Idle research, futile theory, and the risk for education: Reminders of irony and commitment. Educational
Theory, 55(2), pp. 165-183; Goor, Roel van & Heyting, Frieda (2006). The fruits of irony: Gaining insight into how we make meaning of the
world. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 25(6), pp. 479–496; Lear, Jonathan (2011). A case for irony. Harvard: Harvard University;
Smith, Richard (2011). The play of Socratic dialogue. Journal of Philosophy of Education, 45(2), pp. 221–233.
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This sounds paradoxical as it is he himself who has written the texts,
while at the same time, the texts are given a language and content that
go beyond his intentions and purposes. Through Governance’s
existence and counter-intuition, the authority of the author or creator
is, to a certain degree, both undermined and threatened. More
specifically, this occurs through the deeper meaning, which is added to
the texts in an enigmatic manner. In essence, this is a deeper meaning
that will influence the Creator’s introspection and self-criticism
[16,17].
Irony is essentially responsible for this inexplicable and mysterious
phenomenon occurring because, without irony or similar rhetorical
devices; the texts would lack the necessary contradictions and
paradoxes. Instead, we would have at our disposal texts which are over-
pedagogical, and in which the meaning would essentially be
transparent. Irony avoids such rigidity in the sense that it initiates
movements and applies forces which can be singular or autonomous,
and they may act in another direction than that which the author had
originally intended. Therefore, irony provides creative possibilities. It is
reasonable to interpret Governance or the inexplicable phenomenon
that Kierkegaard discusses as the enigmatic element in the text. We use
the word enigmatic because it arises in an inexplicable manner, outside
Kierkegaard’s control.
There is something metamorphological and self-generating in irony,
which is transformed into a kind of co-author or mentor and teacher
to the original author. We can identify at least two ‘authors’: the
original author is the creator of his own work, while the ‘co-author’ or
Governance assists in recreating the author. This is supported by
Kierkegaard himself when he stresses that, “it is Governance who has
raised me.” In addition to writing, the author is himself written. Not
only is the author the source of his authorship, but the authorship is
itself also the source of the author(s). Alternatively, perhaps it is the
authors who write in an ironic manner with the aim of losing their
selves? By this, we imply that the self is essentially lost because it
culminates being steered, raised and taught by its own writing.
It is nonetheless possible, for the purpose of conducting didactic
research, to look back at what one has written and review the ironic
questioning and the ever-present doubt, which is an important marker
of irony, in such a way that one’s writing becomes so much more than
an archived article, dissertation or research report. Instead, what has
been presented through writing becomes a form of Bildungsroman,
which the author himself can refer back to as an important part of his
own education, and can provide new perspectives on research.
Conclusion
In this paper, it has been argued that didactic practice is related to
theory. In other words, theory and practice are interdependent and
conjoined in a manner that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to
separate the two from one another. Such a continuum between theory
and practice implies that didactic practice itself is laden with theory
through scientific theory, experiences, expectations, etc. Accordingly,
the actual field of practice or pure practice per se does not exist.
Nonetheless, didactic practice is not necessarily derived from theory or
normative principles because it cannot encompass everything that
occurs in practise. Undoubtedly, theory can aid practitioners to a
certain extent by creating possibilities which practice alone can never
achieve. In spite of this, the application of theory will not allow us to
understand didactic practice in its entirety. This owes to the aporia of
didactic practice and its enigmatic basis, whose unpredictability must
be taken into account. To avoid the risk of immunising the unknown
and the enigmatic, we have introduced what we have referred to as
ironic questioning. This is understood as an aid or supplement to
teaching (C1), planning and evaluation (C2), and the construction of
didactic theory (C3) because, amongst other reasons, it makes it
possible to destabilise and complicate paradoxes, and other similar
elements. Notwithstanding, didactics remains a normative discipline.
However, by linking itself to the ironic questioning, it is normative
without actually being normative. This leaves us with a form of
didactic practice based on doubt but also with curiosity, not just in the
period preceding (C2) or during the teaching (C1), but also
subsequently (C3) when didactic research can represent a basis for the
researcher’s own education. In this way, the researcher acts as the sub-
ject understood as sub-jected, rather than as an objective observer. In
other words, the researcher becomes sub-jected by his or her own
research, which can allow for new thinking related to research and the
construction of new didactic theory.
All in all, the ironic questioning will not only allow for the
expansion and renewal of practice in schools. It will also stand as a
counterweight to today’s evidence-based, results-orientated, utilitarian
pedagogy and didactics, while it will shed new light on the normative
aspects of didactics, regarding planning (C2), teaching (C1) and
research, and/or development work (C3).
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